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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent “war on terror” have created a 
widespread culture of fear within the United States.1 As a result, national security 
efforts have focused significantly on fighting terrorism and capturing terrorist 
suspects.2 Since 2001, U.S. officials have exercised significantly broader 
discretion in domestic counter terrorism enforcement,3 to which the judiciary has 
largely acquiesced.4 This enforcement involves varying methods of questioning 
and removing terrorist suspects when such practices are considered necessary to 
national security.5 The general fear of terrorism provides the foundation for a 
political and social landscape that accepts extreme interrogation techniques at the 
hands of U.S. officials, and the removal of suspects to countries that practice 
torture.6 As a result of this landscape, along with various other legal factors, U.S. 
courts dismiss claims of torture and extraordinary rendition7 brought by falsely 
accused terrorist suspects.8 
While U.S. courts have a pattern of denying extraordinary rendition claims,9 
international courts and other countries have shown a willingness to assert 
jurisdiction and provide relief.10 For example, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the United Kingdom have recently provided compensation to 
 
1. See WILLIAM SCHULZ, TAINTED LEGACY: 9/11 AND THE RUIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (2003). See 
generally Patryk Pawlak, Ten Years After 9/11, Fears Trump Freedoms, DW (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.dw. 
de/ten-years-after-9-11-fears-trump-freedoms/a-15377165-1. 
2. See BARBARA OLSHANSKY, DEMOCRACY DETAINED: SECRET UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES IN THE 
U.S. WAR ON TERROR 1 (2007). 
3. Id. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 566 (2d Cir. 2009) (where U.S. officials participated in 
transferring a terrorist suspect to Syria, where he was tortured for information); see also El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (where the CIA held and tortured a terrorist suspect in a secret prison). 
4. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 582 (dismissing Arar’s claims against U.S. officials); see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d 
at 348 (dismissing El-Masri’s claims against U.S. officials based on confidentiality and state secret privilege). 
5. See OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 1; see Arar, 585 F.3d at 565 (where U.S. officials participated in 
transferring a terrorist suspect to Syria, where he was tortured for information); see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 
300 (where the CIA held and tortured a terrorist suspect in a secret prison). 
6. See OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 2. See generally Pawlak, supra note 1. 
7. Rendition refers to the transfer of a fugitive from one state to another or from one country to another. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (9th ed. 2009). Extraordinary rendition (or irregular renditions) is a “transfer, 
without formal charges, trial, or court approval, of a person suspected of being a terrorist or supporter of a 
terrorist group to a foreign nation for imprisonment and interrogation on behalf of the transferring nation.” Id. 
8. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 582 (dismissing Arar’s claims against U.S. officials); see also El-Masri, 479 F.3d 
at 348 (dismissing El-Masri’s claims against U.S. officials based on confidentiality and state secret privilege). 
9.  See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 348 (dismissing El-Masri’s claims against U.S. officials based on 
confidentiality and state secret privilege). See generally Arar, 585 F.3d 559 (dismissing Arar’s claims against 
U.S. officials). 
10. See El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 87 (2012), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621; see also Dominic Casciani, 
UK Pays £2.2m to Settle Libyan Rendition Claim, BBC NEWS UK (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/uk-20715507. 
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individuals alleging extraordinary rendition and the resulting torture.11 Whether 
the United States’ reluctance to hear extraordinary rendition cases stems from 
legal doctrines or fear of international repercussions, the United States is facing 
widespread criticism for failing to hear valid claims domestically.12 Therefore, the 
United States should take legislative steps to create a cause of action that 
compensates victims of extraordinary rendition and torture where U.S. officers 
are involved.13 Failure to take these legislative steps will allow U.S. officers to 
continue violating international and domestic law without accountability.14 
Furthermore, commentators believe that the when the United States is 
responsible for injuries, it should compensate the victims of extraordinary 
rendition.15 
This Comment will look at the inadequacies of domestic causes of action 
through the example of Maher Arar’s case in U.S. courts, and use this illustration 
to show why such claims have not been successful domestically.16 It will also 
compare similar cases that have been decided recently in the European Court of 
Human Rights and the United Kingdom.17 The contrast of domestic and 
international cases will show not only that the U.S. causes of action are unlikely 
to provide relief to victims in their current state,18 but also that the United States 
needs to be held legally accountable for its involvement.19 Part II, will look at the 
case of Maher Arar,20 since it helps to express the need for compensation in 
extraordinary rendition cases.21 A close examination of this case identifies the 
causes of action that are currently available under U.S. law.22 This section will 
also analyze the district court’s reasoning for dismissing his case and explain 
why any future cases would likely have the same result.23 
Part III will analyze the issues of confidentiality and state secret privilege,24 
which are currently two of the largest barriers for a U.S. court to hear 
 
11. El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 88; Casciani, supra note 10. 
12. James Goldston, U.S. Cannot Close Door on Legacy of Torture So Easily, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/us-cannot-close-door-legacy-torture-
so-easily. 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. See OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 216. 
15. Goldston, supra note 12. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See infra Parts II, IV. 
19. Goldston, supra note 12. 
20. See generally Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See Infra Part II. 
23. See Infra Part II. 
24. State secret privilege is an evidentiary rule, which excludes any evidence that would expose 
information that may endanger national security. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 207. The court will do an in-
camera assessment of the evidence and use affidavits of government officials to determine whether there is a 
state secret issue. Id. 
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extraordinary rendition cases on the merits.25 To propose possibilities for 
overcoming these issues, this section will look at how state secret privilege and 
confidentiality are dealt with in other countries and in international courts.26  
Part IV will discuss the recently decided cases in the European Court of 
Human Rights and the United Kingdom.27 These international cases have similar 
factual backgrounds to Arar 28 and other cases previously brought in U.S. courts,29 
but have provided compensation for victims.30 The comparison of cases in 
international courts and foreign countries with U.S. cases makes the reluctance of 
the United States to provide compensation for internationally accepted human 
rights violations even more controversial.31 
Lastly, Part V will explain the changes that are needed in the United States to 
provide compensation for victims of extraordinary rendition when U.S. officials 
are directly involved.32 This section will explain why creating a remedy through 
the judiciary, such as expanding the current Bivens33 claim, is unlikely. Instead, a 
new cause of action will likely need to be created legislatively.34 A new statute 
would avoid the separation of powers concerns that the U.S. judiciary currently 
holds with regards to expanding the Bivens action to new contexts.35 However, in 
order for new legislation to occur, there will need to be a change in public 
perception.36 U.S. culture generally needs to move away from blind fear of 
terrorism and focus on the rights of individuals who have been harmed.37 
  
 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. Infra Part III. 
27. See generally El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621; see generally Casciani, supra note 10. 
28. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 560 (2d Cir. 2009). 
29. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (where the CIA held and tortured a 
terrorist suspect in a secret prison. The U.S. court dismissed the case due to state secret privilege). 
30. El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 79; Casciani, supra note 10. 
31. Goldston, supra note 12. 
32. Infra Part V. 
33. A Bivens claim is a judicially created action that allows an individual to bring a cause of action 
against federal officers for constitutional violations. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971). 
34. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that it would abstain from expanding the 
Bivens claim judicially, arguing that the legislature is better suited to creating a new cause of action). 
35. Id. 
36. See Pawlak, supra note 1. 
37.  See OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 2. See generally Pawlak, supra note 1. 
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II. MAHER ARAR: AN EXAMPLE OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND CURRENT 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Factual Background 
The story of Maher Arar is typical of many extraordinary rendition cases, 
both in its facts and in its dismissal by a U.S. court.38 Maher Arar is a dual 
Canadian-Syrian citizen who lived in Canada since he was 17 years old.39 While 
returning home from a trip to Tunisia in September 2002, Arar was detained at 
John F. Kennedy (“JFK”) Airport by U.S. airport security and asked questions 
regarding affiliation with known terrorists.40 Although Arar admitted to a 
connection with one individual known to have terrorist associations during 
questioning, he denied any personal affiliation with a terrorist group.41 
After spending a night in the airport, where Arar was denied any contact with 
an attorney or family members in Canada, Arar was given the opportunity to 
voluntarily return to Syria.42 Despite his adamant objections and insistence that he 
would be tortured if he returned to Syria, Arar was told that there was no risk of 
torture.43 That same day he was transferred to the Metropolitan Detention Center 
in New York for a period of twelve days.44 On October 1st, removal proceedings 
were begun by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) stating that 
Arar was excludable from the United States based on his membership in a 
terrorist organization.45 At this point he was able to communicate with family 
members in Canada who in turn contacted the Canadian embassy and retained a 
lawyer for Arar.46 Despite having representation and a visit from a consular 
official, Arar’s attorney was denied basic information as to Arar’s whereabouts 
and was therefore unable to properly represent him.47 
Before being removed from the United States, Arar signed a written 
statement declaring that his desired country of removal was Canada and not 
Syria.48 This desire was based on Arar’s knowledge that Syrian officials have a 
history of torturing prisoners.49 Notwithstanding his written statement, U.S. 
officials stated that removing Arar to Syria was not inconsistent with domestic 
 
38. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 199. 
39. Arar, 585 F.3d at 565.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 203. 
44. Arar, 585 F.3d at 565.  
45. Id.  
46. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 201. 
47. Id. at 202-03. 
48. Arar, 585 F.3d at 566. 
49. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 202. 
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obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture50 since there was 
no evidence that Arar would be tortured upon removal.51 Later that day, Arar was 
flown to Amman, Jordan where he was brutally beaten52 before being transferred 
to Syrian officials.53 Syrian officials detained Arar at a Syrian Military 
Intelligence Facility where he was interrogated using torture methods for twelve 
days.54 After an inquiry by Canadian officials as to Arar’s whereabouts, the 
interrogations ceased but Arar was not released for almost a year.55 
During his confinement, Canadian officials were aware of Arar’s 
whereabouts and location.56 However, it was not until almost a full year later that 
Arar informed the Canadian officials that he was being held in a windowless cell 
six feet by three feet, and seven feet high.57 Arar also informed officials that he 
had been tortured, and five days later, he signed a confession that he was trained 
in Afghanistan as a terrorist.58 Even after being moved from the small cell where 
he had spent the past ten months, Arar was not returned to Canada until October 
5, 2003; more than a year since his original detention at JFK Airport.59 
Arar alleged that U.S. officials created the questions asked by Syrian 
officials60 and that his responses were being used for U.S. intelligence purposes.61 
Despite this allegation, and Arar’s belief that U.S. officials used his confession, 
no claims were ever brought against Arar alleging he was a member of a terrorist 
organization.62 After his return to Canada, Arar brought four claims against U.S. 
officers and all were dismissed for varying reasons.63 
 
50. “1. No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 2. For the purpose 
of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
51. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 202. 
52. Id. at 203. 
53. Id. 
54. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 566 (2d Cir. 2009). 
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. 
60. Arar states that the questions he was asked by Syrian officials were the same questions asked by U.S. 
interrogators, leading him to believe that the questions were provided by the U.S. government. OLSHANSKY, 
supra note 2, at 204. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 205. 
63. See Arar, 585 F.3d. at 582.  
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B. Arar’s Complaint Brought in U.S. Court: Analysis of the TVPA Claim 
In January 2004, Arar filed a four-count complaint in the Eastern District of 
New York seeking damages from federal officials.64 The claims addressed both 
his detention in the United States and his detention and interrogation in Syria.65 
The first count brought by Arar was under the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(“TVPA”).66 As a statutory cause of action, a TVPA claim can be brought against 
an “individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any 
foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture.”67 The assessment whether an 
individual is acting under color of foreign law is a fact specific judgment, where 
the authority of the foreign law needs to be proven.68 Therefore, in order for Arar 
to bring a claim under the TVPA, Arar would have to prove that the defendants 
were acting under Syrian authority.69 
Instead of claiming color of foreign law, Arar claimed that U.S. federal 
officers were conspiring with Syrian officials to encourage the torture and 
detention.70 Therefore, the claim was dismissed as being insufficiently pleaded 
since solicitation or conspiracy is inadequate under a TVPA claim.71 The only 
way Arar could have potentially succeeded with a TVPA claim would be to show 
that the U.S. officials were given orders from Syrian officials to turn Arar over.72 
Not only would this be very difficult to prove without access to confidential 
information, but Arar was in fact making the opposite allegation;73 Arar claimed 
that the Syrians detained, questioned, and tortured him in order to transfer 
information back to the Americans.74 
C.  Arar’s Complaint Brought in U.S. Court: Analysis of the Fifth Amendment 
Claim 
Counts two and three of Arar’s claim were for violations of the Fifth 
Amendment for Arar’s detention and torture in Syria.75 The final count was for 
violation of the Fifth Amendment for Arar’s detention in the United States before 
 
64. Id. at 567. 
65. See id. at 567.  
66. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See also Arar, 585 F.3d at 
567. 
67. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(b)(1). 
68. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568. 
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. Id.  
72. See id. 
73. Id. 
74. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 568. 
75. Id. at 567. 
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he was removed to Syria.76 The claimant has an extremely high burden to prove 
these Fifth Amendment claims.77 In satisfying these burdens, inferences that an 
official is involved in a conspiracy will be insufficient unless they can point to 
specific facts leading to the allegation.78 For a claimant in a civilian position, the 
specific facts needed to allege a conspiracy are generally confidential 
information.79 The plaintiff “must provide some factual basis supporting a 
meeting of the minds, such that defendants entered into an agreement, express or 
tacit, to achieve the unlawful end.”80 Therefore, a Fifth Amendment claim is 
unlikely to ever be successful in the context of extraordinary rendition, since the 
claimant needs to prove far more than speculative facts in order to have the case 
heard on its merits.81 
Absent from Arar’s case were any specific facts tending to prove the United 
States had any agreement with Syria to extract information from Arar through 
torture.82 This put him at a distinct disadvantage in pleading with specificity since 
he was dealing with airport personnel, guards, and interrogators.83 Therefore, the 
information Arar was given throughout being held would be intentionally vague 
and it would be difficult to access further facts in order to specify his complaint.84 
Although the Fifth Amendment counts were dismissed for failure to state a 
claim, the original argument raised by the defense was that the court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claims.85 The Second Circuit declined to 
decide this issue since it dismissed the claims for other reasons.86 However, a 
brief assessment of this argument is worth examining for clarity.87 
Since Arar is not a citizen of the United States,88 the decision to exclude or 
deport him is largely within the discretion of the Attorney General (“AG”).89 
 
76. Id. at 568.  
77. See id. at 569.  
78. Id. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 557 (2007). 
79. See e.g. Arar, 585 F.3d at 576. 
80. Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (addressing 
conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985).  
81. See e.g. Arar, 585 F.3d at 569. 
82. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining why the claim was insufficiently pleaded by Arar: 
“[h]e alleges (in passive voice) that his requests to make phone calls were ignored, and that he was told that was 
not entitled to a lawyer, but he fails to link these denials to any defendant, named or unnamed”).  
83. See generally id. 
84. See generally id. 
85. Id. at 570.  
86. See id. at 563.  
87. Arar, 585 F.3d at 570. The court goes through a brief analysis of the application of U.S. immigration 
law to Arar’s claims. Id. 
88. OLSHANSKY, supra note 2, at 199. 
89. Arar, 585 F.3d at 570 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)) (“any policy 
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of 
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so 
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Once a person is admitted with inspection into the United States, they are 
afforded greater substantive and procedural due process rights than a person who 
was not lawfully admitted.90 When a person is not lawfully admitted into the 
country, or enters without inspection, they are considered to be “stopped at the 
border” for immigration purposes.91 Thus, they are considered “excludable” as 
opposed to “deportable,”92 which grants them fewer rights under the 
Constitution.93 Even though Arar was transferred to a facility in Brooklyn and 
there is no doubt that he was physically present in the United States in literal 
terms, he was not considered present within the United States under legal 
principles.94 In order to be present in the United States for purposes of 
immigration, he would need to make it through the border inspection process, 
which Arar never did.95 
Therefore, the defendants made the argument that because areas of 
immigration were within the discretion of the AG, the court should not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim where a person was never admitted into 
the United States.96 Although the due process review of inadmissible aliens is 
limited,97 the court should still be able to hear extraordinary rendition cases since 
they bring up an exception to the AG’s discretion.98 The discretion of the AG can 
be reviewed by courts when their actions are in violation of U.S. and 
international law, such as is the case when a person is removed to a country 
where their life or freedom may be threatened.99 This is known as the principle of 
non-refoulement and it is a limitation on discretion.100 Although also a part of 
 
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference”). 
90. See, e.g., Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594. See generally Erin Craddock, Tortuous Consequences and the 
Case of Maher Arar: Can Canadian Solutions “Cure” the Due Process Deficiencies in the US Removal 
Proceedings?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2008) (explaining the differences between when a person is 
deportable and when they are excludable). 
91. Craddock, supra note 90, at 623 (explaining the level of due process a person is given, dependent on 
whether a person has been admitted to the United States). 
92. Id. at 623-25. In order to be considered deportable, a person has to be originally admitted into the 
United States. If they are being deported, this benefit of admission is being revoked either because they are no 
longer eligible, such as an expired visa, or they have taken actions that the United States determines are grounds 
for deportation. Id. 
93. Id. at 625 (explaining how the court has only specified the minimum level of due process given to 
inadmissible aliens, but not specified the outer limit). 
94. See id. at 623. 
95. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009). 
96. Id. at 570. 
97. Craddock, supra note 90, at 625 (explaining how the court has only specified the minimum level of 
due process given to inadmissible aliens, but not specified the outer limit). 
98. Id. at 627 (explaining that the AG may not remove an alien to a country where the alien’s life or 
freedom would be threatened). 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  
06_REED.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2014 4:54 PM 
2014 / Compensation for Extraordinary Rendition 
140 
customary international law,101 Congress enshrined non-refoulement into U.S. law 
when the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act passed in 1998.102 
Therefore, although extraordinary rendition involved removal proceedings 
generally granted to the discretion of the AG, the violation of non-refoulement 
should allow the court to have subject-matter jurisdiction.103 
D. Arar’s Complaint Brought in U.S. Court: Analysis of the Bivens Claim 
The most likely judicially created claim for relief in extraordinary rendition 
cases is a Bivens claim,104 a claim that was also unsuccessfully alleged by Arar.105 
The court in the Bivens case recognized an individual cause of action against 
federal officers for constitutional violations.106 This was the first time claimants 
had a judicially created right to bring federal claims directly under the 
Constitution.107 However, even this claim is limited almost exclusively to its 
original context.108 The two extensions were for misconduct by prison officials109 
and employment discrimination.110 Neither of these situations is similar enough to 
the situation of extraordinary rendition to create a direct cause of action in this 
context.111 
In Arar, the court assessed the claim in light of the contexts that had already 
successfully utilized the Bivens claim.112 To decide whether Arar’s case was 
extending Bivens to a new context, the court “construe[d] the word context as it 
is commonly used in law; to reflect a potentially recurring scenario that has 
similar legal and factual components.”113 To extend Bivens to a new context, the 
court makes a two-part determination, it decides: (1) if there is an alternative 
remedy for the plaintiff, and (2) if “special factors counsel hesitation.”114 Based 
 
101. Customary international law is law that has become so widely accepted in the international 
community that it is considered binding on all countries, regardless of whether any treaty or agreement has been 
signed. Customary International Law Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY.COM, http://encyclopedia. 
thefreedictionary.com/customary+international+law (last visited Aug. 24, 2013). 
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006). Craddock, supra note 90, at 627. 
103. See Craddock, supra note 90, at 627; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 
104. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971) (where the plaintiff was subjected 
to an unlawful warrantless search by federal officers and the court created a cause of action for a claimant to 
directly sue the officers involved). 
105. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563-64 (2d Cir. 2009). 
106. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. 
107. Arar, 585 F.3d at 571. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. 
108. Arar, 585 F.3d at 571. The claim has been in existence since 1971 and has only twice been extended 
past its original context.  
109. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 14 (1980). 
110. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229 (1979). 
111. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24-26; see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 248-55. 
112. Arar, 585 F.3d at 571. 
113. Id. at 572. 
114. Id. 
06_REED.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2014 4:54 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27 
141 
on this assessment, and the fact that international law generally considers 
extraordinary rendition to be a distinct act, the court held that Arar would be 
extending Bivens to a new context.115 
Once the new context of a claim has been established, the first prong looks at 
alternative remedial schemes, such as an Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) review or TVPA action.116 In Arar, the court sidestepped a complete 
analysis of this issue by stating that extraordinary rendition would fail under the 
second prong of new context analysis in Bivens.117 Despite this determination, the 
court did a cursory assessment of whether a remedy existed in the context of 
immigration, or a statutorily created right.118 The assessment comes up with no 
concrete remedies because Arar’s previous actions were dismissed and INA 
review is limited when the person being removed is considered a threat to 
national security.119 The only remedy mentioned is that Arar received ten million 
dollars in compensation from the Canadian government for their part in Arar’s 
rendition.120 However, the court does not cite this compensation as the reason for 
dismissing the first prong.121 Thus, it is unlikely that a more thorough analysis of 
the first prong would be able to produce a sufficient domestic remedial scheme.122 
The second prong of the test is whether “special factors counsel hesitation” 
in expanding a Bivens remedy to a new context.123 This prong has traditionally 
proven the most difficult to overcome because there have been many special 
factors considered and applied by the court.124 Special factors that have defeated 
other cases are: separation of powers, military concerns, foreign policy 
considerations, and national security concerns.125 Clearly, these can be read as 
expansive and grant courts with broad discretion to decline to extend a Bivens 
claim.126 In the context of extraordinary rendition, many of these factors could be 
used to defeat the claim because terrorism involves national security interests as 
well as military and international relations issues.127 
Based on the court’s broad discretion,128 it is unlikely that any court would 
allow an extraordinary rendition case to withstand the second prong of Bivens. 
Thus, the only possibility of a successful Bivens claims rests in judicially 
 
115. Id. at 573. 
116. Id. at 572. 
117. Id. at 574.  
118. Arar, 585 F.3d at 573.  
119. Id. at 571. 
120. Id. at 580. 
121. Id.  
122. See id. 
123. Id. at 572.  
124. Arar, 585 F.3d at 573.  
125. Id. 
126. See id.  
127. Id.  
128. See id. 
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removing the second prong and focusing the inquiry on whether the complainant 
has an alternative remedial scheme.129 Because the court’s analysis of alternative 
remedies in Arar was not fully addressed,130 and other avenues of redress are 
equally difficult to achieve, an analysis of the first prong alone should allow a 
Bivens claim to be expanded to a new context. 
In justifying the dismissal of Arar’s Bivens claim, the court went on to 
discuss the underlying hesitation for allowing judicial review of extraordinary 
rendition cases.131 The court explained that by their very nature, cases such as 
Arar’s involve national security and foreign relations concerns best addressed by 
the executive branch.132 Because extraordinary rendition involves cases where 
there is a potential threat to national security, and relations with a foreign 
government, the judiciary is hesitant to involve itself.133 Although the court 
admitted that in certain specific circumstances they would review decisions 
involving national security and state secrets, these are very limited.134 In general, 
the court expressed concern that extending Bivens actions to extraordinary 
rendition would allow for judicial review in an area traditionally left to the 
executive.135 
With respect to the separation of powers, the court admitted a judicial avenue 
for redress would exist if Congress was to create a statutory remedy.136 Absent 
this authority, however, extraordinary rendition extends too far into those foreign 
affairs issues traditionally assessed by the executive.137 The justification for the 
judiciary to abstain from national security concerns is that they have limited 
knowledge of the security threats generally facing the nation.138 Therefore, the 
executive branch is better suited to address international relations because they 
have access to all information on issues of national security and can speak with 
one voice.139 Furthermore, if there were judicial review of all executive decisions, 
it could undermine the ability of the executive branch to act in situations of 
necessity and take a firm stance on issues of national importance.140 
 
129. See id. 
130. Arar, 585 F.3d at 574. 
131. Id. at 575. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 576. 
137. Id. at 575. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320-22 (1936) 
(noting the “plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations”). 
138. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008). 
139. See id. 
140. See id. at 796-97. 
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This does not mean, however, that the judicial branch has no jurisdiction to 
assess executive actions in foreign affairs.141 In Arar, the court stated that the 
courts may reexamine judgments if “there is an unflagging duty to exercise our 
jurisdiction.”142 However, the court does not specify a set of facts where this 
would be the case.143 Otherwise, “the danger of foreign citizens’ using the courts 
in situations such as this to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is 
sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage 
remedy should exist.”144 In making this statement, the court strongly asserted that 
extending relief to plaintiffs such as Arar is unlikely to occur under a judicially 
created cause of action.145 The opinion does, however, leave open the possibility 
of a congressionally created remedy, albeit it appears narrow.146 
III. STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION: THE MAIN 
BARRIERS TO RELIEF IN U.S. COURTS 
Although the court in Arar declined to discuss issues of state secret privilege 
since they ruled on other grounds, this is a major barrier to extraordinary 
rendition claims.147 The concern of the court, and the U.S. government, is that 
hearing certain cases in open court will expose state secrets and confidential 
information.148 Because these cases generally involve the removal of terrorist 
suspects from U.S. soil, domestic claims would likely have to involve the 
exposure of some classified information.149 
A. The Canadian Approach Taken for Maher Arar 
One alternative would be to provide compensation without a formal legal 
process—a remedy that would dissolve the need for an evidentiary presentation. 
The court in Arar discusses that this is what Canada did when they gave Arar a 
$10.5 million settlement.150 However, the Arar court also mentions the need for 
Canada to keep its own materials confidential.151 The Canadian process did 
involve a formal investigation into the nature of the terrorist allegations lasting 
 
141. Arar, 585 F.3d at 575. 
142. Id. at 576. 
143. See id. 
144. Id. (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Arar, 585 F.3d at 576. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 590 (quoting Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, Prime Minister Releases Letter of 
Apology to Maher Arar and His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26, 2007), 
available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1509. 
151. Id. at 576. 
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longer than two years.152 It was not done, however, through a lawsuit resulting in 
a formal trial.153 Instead, Canada established the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar in order to investigate 
the claim.154 At the end of the commission’s investigation, Arar was given a 
settlement as well as a formal apology from the RCMP Commissioner stating: 
Mr. Arar, I wish to take this opportunity to express publicly to you and to 
your wife and to your children how truly sorry I am for whatever part the 
actions of the RCMP may have contributed to the terrible injustices that 
you experienced and the pain that you and your family endured.155 
Because Canada was the source of intelligence on Arar’s alleged terrorist 
ties, a lawsuit would have likely exposed the source of the Canadian 
information.156 In giving compensation after a formal inquiry, Canada essentially 
admitted fault without having an evidentiary hearing,157 which it likely 
determined would be too costly from a national security perspective. As a result, 
it is possible that Canada provided the compensation without judicial process as a 
means to avoid exposure of state secrets.158 
Although Canada compensated Arar, it appears unlikely that the United 
States would do so for several reasons. First, because the United States has far 
more cases dealing with extraordinary rendition and other terrorist related 
claims,159 providing compensation for every claim against the United States could 
result in too many settlements for the U.S. government. If the U.S. government 
established a commission similar to the one created by Canada however,160 a 
formal investigation could be done privately, without the risk of exposing 
confidential information. 
This issue raises a debate over striking the proper balance between national 
security and compensation for victims of torture.161 Even though protecting state 
secrets is a valid reason for courts to deny jurisdiction over claims for 
extraordinary rendition,162 it does not necessarily follow that extraordinary 
 
152. J. Hashmi, Outsourcing Torture: U.S. Court Blocks Maher Arar’s Lawsuit, MUSLIM MATTERS (Nov. 
3, 2009), http://muslimmatters.org/2009/11/03/outsourcing-torture/. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See Ottawa Trying to Hold Back Documents from Arar Inquiry, CBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2004, 6:34 
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2004/04/29/arar040429.html [hereinafter Ottawa]. 
157. See Hashmi, supra note 152. 
158. See Ottawa, supra note 156. 
159. Jonathan Horowitz & Stacy Cammarano, 20 Extraordinary Facts About CIA Extraordinary 
Rendition and Secret Detention, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.opensocietyfoundations. 
org/voices/20-extraordinary-facts-about-cia-extraordinary-rendition-and-secret-detention. 
160. See Hashmi, supra note 152. 
161. See generally Horowitz & Cammarano, supra note 159. 
162. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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rendition victims should be denied compensation in all future cases. The court in 
Arar stated that because the United States has a long history of public trials, 
creating an exception requires special circumstances.163 Despite this statement, 
the court also recognized that even when the right to an open trial presumptively 
attaches, this presumption could be overcome.164 It is likely that information in 
Arar’s case could have exposed some state secrets if they were made publically 
available during trial.165 One solution to this issue would be for portions of court 
proceedings to be closed to the public, as has been done before in both 
domestic166 and international courts.167 
B. Approaches Taken in International Courts 
International courts also hear cases involving information that needs to be 
kept from the public, since these cases deal with government actions, state 
secrets, and other confidential information.168 Despite the nature of the material, 
international courts continue to decide these cases in an effective, compensatory 
manner.
169
 
One of the major issues that often makes public trials difficult, but is dealt 
with by international criminal tribunals, is sensitive witness testimony.170 
Although these tribunals recognize that a public trial is an important part of a fair 
trial, they also recognize that there are exceptions to this right.171 Specifically, the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) allows for closed or private sessions 
for reasons of morality, security, safety, public order, and non-disclosure of the 
identity of the protected witness or interests of justice.172 Similarly, the rules of 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) allow for private sessions to protect an 
 
163. Id. at 577. 
164. Id. (listing cases where the court may grant closed proceedings including Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U.S. 39, 45 (1984); United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Doe, 63 
F.3d 121, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
165. Id. at 576. 
166. See id. at 577 (listing cases where the court may grant closed proceedings including Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 45; Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 199-200; Doe, 63 F.3d at 127-28). 
167. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW & PRACTICE TRAINING 
MATERIALS: PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 11-12, available at http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_12 
_Procedure_and_evidence.pdf [hereinafter ICLS]. 
168. Id. 
169. See El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 79 (2012), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621; see also Casciani, supra note 
10. 
170. ICLS, supra note 167, at 12. 
171. Id. at 11.  
172. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, at art. 6(1), ETS 5 (Nov. 4, 1950), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b 
3b04.html. 
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accused, witnesses, victims, or confidential or sensitive evidence.173 
Consequently, these international tribunals are granted broad discretion to limit 
public access to trials when any of these concerns are present.174 
Whether to make portions of a trial public is a decision left to the judge.175 In 
making the decision, the judge must seek to balance the public interest in access 
to the trial against the nature of the interest being protected.176 Generally, closed 
trials occur in circumstances where the exposure of testimony could mean 
potential harm to either a witness or the witness’s family.177 However, the ICC 
also creates exceptions for when testimony may create concerns over national 
security and state secrets.178 Considering trials have been conducted in closed 
court in many international tribunals with relative ease, closed courts could likely 
be implemented in the United States with similar provisions. However, since the 
United States must abide by the Constitution, legislation, and binding precedent, 
the implementation of closed courts would be much more complex179 than 
international courts that are only regulated by a single document. Despite these 
complications, the United States could use international tribunals as a guide to 
implementation. 
IV. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION CASES IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Although extraordinary rendition cases have never been successful in U.S. 
courts,180 they have recently been successful in international courts and other 
countries.181 These cases involve very similar fact patterns, wherein a terrorist 
suspect is detained and removed to a foreign country where they are tortured and 
held for an extended period without judicial process.182 One case involved Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) officers operating under U.S. authority in a secret 
 
173. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 64(7), 68(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. I-
38544, 127, 130, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html. 
174. See ICLS, supra note 167, at 12; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 173, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 129-30. 
175. See ICLS, supra note 167, at 12; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 173, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 130. 
176. See ICLS, supra note 167, at 12; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 173, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 127. 
177. ICLS, supra note 167, at 12; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 173, 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 129-30. 
178. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 173, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 133. 
179. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 577 (2d Cir. 2009). 
180. See id. at 563 (where U.S. officials participated in transferring a terrorist suspect to Syria, where he 
was tortured for information); see also El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2007) (where 
the CIA held and tortured a terrorist suspect in a secret prison). 
181. See El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 79 (2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621; see also Casciani, supra note 10. 
182. See El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4; see also Casciani, supra note 10. 
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prison, but in a foreign jurisdiction.183 The other recent case involved a joint U.K. 
and U.S. mission, where the suspect was transferred to a foreign operated prison 
where he was tortured and detained by foreign officials.184 Even though these 
cases have been successfully litigated in other forums, none have held the United 
States responsible.185 
One way for an international court, such as the ICC, to have jurisdiction over 
either type of claim against a U.S. national is if the occurrence took place within 
the territory of a state party.186 If this occurred, then the state could refer the case 
to the court against a U.S. national, but not against the United States as a state 
unless there was consent or a treaty provision.187 Therefore, the only international 
tribunal with the real potential to accept jurisdiction over a U.S. extraordinary 
rendition claim is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“IACHR”).188 However, the claims filed with the IACHR have presently not 
moved forward and thus, an international tribunal is yet to hear this type of case 
against the United States.189 
Instead, suspected terrorists have asserted claims of extraordinary rendition 
and torture against state parties that played some role in the rendition,190 or 
against the country to which the individual was removed.191 Although this may be 
an effective way to compensate victims in instances where a country accepts an 
international court’s jurisdiction, or a country hears the case domestically, the 
United States is still not being held legally accountable for their primary role in 
the extraordinary renditions and torture.192 
The most compelling comparisons of the treatment of extraordinary rendition 
cases in other jurisdictions are the recent cases of Sami al-Saadi in the United 
Kingdom,193 and Khaled El-Masri in the European Court of Human Rights.194 
Both cases were recently settled for $3.5 million and $78,000 respectively.195 
Comparing and contrasting the facts and treatment of these cases is an effective 
 
183. See El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.  
184. Casciani, supra note 10. 
185. Jamil Dakwar, Seeking International Accountability for Victims of U.S. Torture, ACLU BLOG OF 
RIGHTS (June 26, 2013, 3:12 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights-national-security/seeking-
international-accountability-victims-us-torture. 
186. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 173, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 99. 
187. Id. 
188. Dakwar, supra note 185. 
189. Id. 
190. Casciani, supra note 10. 
191. See El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 78-79 (2012), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621. 
192. Goldston, supra note 12. 
193. Casciani, supra note 10. 
194. See El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 78. 
195. Casciani, supra note 10. 
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way to determine the inadequacies and possible remedies for the U.S. system.196 
Since other tribunals are able to overcome the issues present in extraordinary 
rendition cases, it is likely that U.S. courts could find means to do the same.197 
A. The United Kingdom: Sami Al-Saadi 
In December 2012, the U.K. government agreed to a settlement in the 
amount of $3.5 million with Sami Al-Saadi and his family.198 Because the case 
never made it to court,199 the U.K. government has not made any admission of 
guilt, although the victims of extraordinary rendition were still compensated for 
the harm they suffered.200 In this case, Al-Saadi and his family were forced to 
board a plane from Hong Kong to Libya in a joint U.K.-U.S. operation, where he 
was held and tortured.201 As a known oppositional leader to Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi, Al-Saadi was viewed as a threat to the government.202 It was not until 
the fall of the Gaddafi regime that documents outlining the rendition came to 
light.203 These documents allegedly prove that the U.K. government was involved 
in the extraordinary rendition of Al-Saadi and his family.204 
Al-Saadi expressed disappointment that the case was not actually heard and 
decided in a court of law,205 because this would have allowed the actual facts to 
come to light and the government would likely have been forced to admit to their 
wrongdoing.206 Despite this disappointment, the settlement allows for coverage of 
Al-Saadi’s medical costs and the education of his children.207 Since he continues 
to need treatment for the injuries he suffered while being held in Libya,208 the 
settlement at least allows him to have some compensation. 
Like our own courts have noted, one of the major issues in this case was a 
problem of national security.209 This is likely one of the main reasons the case 
was never heard in open court; the inquiry would have involved exposure of 
 
196. Dakwar, supra note 185. 
197. See id. 
198. Casciani, supra note 10. 
199. Id. 
200. Family Rendered by UK to Gaddafi Accepts Settlement, REPRIEVE (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www. 
reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_12_13_Saadi_rendition_settlement/. 
201. Id. 
202. Casciani, supra note 10. 
203. Id. 
204. REPRIEVE, supra note 200. 
205. Casciani, supra note 10. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. See Sami Al-Saadi, THE RENDITION PROJECT, http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/global-
rendition/the-detainees/sami-al-saadi.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
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confidential documents that prove the United Kingdom’s involvement.210 
However, that such a large settlement was given in this case is an indicator that 
some of the evidence available would have been harmful to the U.K. 
government.211 Therefore, even though the case was not able to deal with all the 
issues that are present in extraordinary rendition cases, it served the purpose of 
compensation.212 
Al-Saadi has claimed that because of his personal experience with secret 
courts in Libya, he did not want to proceed with a case in U.K. courts that would 
not be public.213 This case comes at a time of great debate over the operation of 
secret courts, which has both supporters and dissenters in the United Kingdom.214 
On the one hand, some kind of closed-door hearings would allow for issues that 
implicate state secret information to be decided.215 However, this type of hearing 
does not involve the public and therefore could be viewed by some as lacking the 
transparency that is central to the rule of law.216 As more cases involving 
confidential international relations come to the forefront of public knowledge, 
there will likely be additional pressure on domestic governments to find a way to 
hear the cases.217 Perhaps this will result in offers of settlements without an 
official legal process, such as what occurred in the Al-Saadi case.218 Although, it 
is also possible that this will appear to be an insufficient remedy when the public 
feels they have the right to know the truth.219 
The main difference between the Al-Saadi case and the Arar case is that Arar 
involved direct contact with U.S. personnel.220 Since Arar was actually on U.S. 
soil when he was transferred, the transport to another country was from the 
United States and not a third country.221 This would seem to be stronger evidence 
of U.S. involvement than in the Al-Saadi case, and therefore should be sufficient 
for U.S. courts to provide compensation in Arar as well. However, the Al-Saadi 
case allegedly included more specific documentation, which was seized when the 
Gaddafi regime fell.222 In this sense, Al-Saadi probably had much greater access 
to damning documents than would be possible in a case like Arar’s where the 
stated facts were insufficient to allege a conspiracy.223 
 
210. See id. 
211. Casciani, supra note 10. 
212. See REPRIEVE, supra note 200. 
213. Casciani, supra note 10. 
214. Id. 
215. See THE RENDITION PROJECT, supra note 209. 
216. REPRIEVE, supra note 200. 
217. See Goldston, supra note 12. 
218. Casciani, supra note 10. 
219. Goldston, supra note 12. 
220. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009). 
221. Id. at 566. 
222. Casciani, supra note 10. 
223. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 569. 
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B. The European Court of Human Rights: Khaled El-Masri 
Although the Al-Saadi settlement has much in common with Arar’s case and 
the types of cases involving U.S. renditions, the December 2012 ruling for 
Khaled El-Masri is the most compelling case to date.224 El-Masri originally 
brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in 2006, 
where he was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union.225 However, the 
case was dismissed in U.S. courts, because the central facts would reveal state 
secrets and were therefore privileged.226 The fact that the ECHR not only heard 
the case on the merits, but also provided compensation shows a direct contrast 
between the two systems.227 
The European Court of Human Rights provided a $78,000 settlement to El-
Masri after hearing the case and coming to a verdict.228 This differentiates the 
case from both Arar’s Canadian and Al-Saadi’s British settlements,229 since the 
Macedonian government was found to be legally at fault.230 Additionally, the fault 
found on behalf of Macedonia was transferring El-Masri to a CIA operated secret 
jail, which served the purpose of harboring suspected Islamist militants for 
questioning.231 Therefore, El-Masri’s case has a more substantial connection to 
the United States, and the completed legal process proves there were some 
actions taken by U.S. officials.232 
According to the record, El-Masri was held in Macedonia for twenty-three 
days and mistreated, at which time he was transferred to a CIA secret detention 
facility in Afghanistan.233 Once he was in Afghanistan, the torture and 
mistreatment continued for four months, at which time U.S. agents left El-Masri 
by the side of the road.234 After many years of fighting legal battles with different 
countries, the verdict from the European Court of Human Rights provided some 
compensation, but more importantly allowed El-Masri to finally clear his name.235 
This case is the first time a European country has been held accountable for its 
involvement with U.S. secret prisons.236 
 
224. Europe Court Award for Rendition Victim Khaled Al-Masri, BBC NEWS EUROPE, http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-europe-20712615 (last updated Dec. 13, 2012, 10:27 AM). 
225. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
226. See id. at 313. 
227. See id. But see El-Masri, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 80 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
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V. RECOMMENDATION: THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO LEGISLATIVELY CREATE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
Through the case of Maher Arar, the unwillingness of the court to grant relief 
under any of the currently available causes of action is apparent.237 Despite the 
argument that the AG has exclusive discretion over immigration removals, and 
that courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the related due process claims, 
the principle of non-refoulement calls this discretion into question.238 However, 
since extraordinary rendition claims involve accessing largely confidential 
information, it is very difficult for any claimant to plead with enough specificity 
to succeed in making a due process claim.239 
Additionally, the courts have declined to expand a judicially created remedy 
to new contexts.240 The Bivens claim,241 which allows a plaintiff to bring a claim 
directly under the Constitution against federal officers, is not available in the 
context of extraordinary rendition.242 The Arar court’s primary reasoning is that 
this is an area too close to foreign relations to be handled by the judiciary, and 
instead, Congress needs to pass new legislation.243 Without access to a Bivens 
claim, victims have few other means of getting compensation since the United 
States has not set up commissions to assess claims outside of court.244 
Instead, the United States needs to look outside its borders to create a new 
legislative cause of action without the flaws of the existing causes of action. 
Although state secret privilege is an issue in extraordinary rendition cases, the 
court in Arar admitted that courts can be closed in certain circumstances.245 Just 
as these circumstances have been extended to state secrets in international courts, 
the United States should adopt this approach in these cases.246 Having a closed 
hearing may not create the most transparency, but it would allow for victims to 
receive much deserved compensation, and allow the United States to comply 
with its international obligations.247 
With the two recent decisions by the United Kingdom and The European 
Court of Human Rights,248 the pressure to compensate is increasing for the United 
States.249 Now that both international tribunals and other countries have processed 
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these claims through a formal judicial process, the United States will be under 
added pressure to adopt new approaches.250 The most likely avenue for this will 
be for Congress to pass new legislation that specifically creates a cause of action 
for victims of extraordinary rendition when U.S. officials play a role.251 The 
legislation will need to state a lower level of specificity required to survive 
summary judgment, since claimants have less access to confidential information 
than in an average case.252 Additionally, the legislature can specify that certain 
portions of the hearing will be held in closed court, in order to bypass issues of 
state secret privilege.253 
With these primary issues out of the way, the court should be able to apply 
new legislation without the separation of powers concerns expressed by the Arar 
court.254 Although public perception towards the treatment of terrorist suspects 
may need to change in order for Congress to pass a new statute, added 
international pressure may help to ease this cultural shift. 
In the last decade, the increasingly globalized world has become focused on 
fighting terrorism, especially within the United States.255 Fueled by fear, the 
United States has intensified methods of removal and interrogation, many of 
which are contrary to domestic and international law.256 Although protection of 
the public is important, there must be means of maintaining national security 
without infringing on recognized individual rights. Specifically, the problem of 
extraordinary rendition is becoming an international issue with increased focus 
and scrutiny.257 As this area of the law develops, critics agree that the United 
States needs to comply with their domestic and international legal agreements 
and compensate those who have been harmed by this practice.258 
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